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What is Really so Bad About a Different Rule
of Law?: The Afghan Legal System
Reanalyzed
by DANA COOK-MILLIGAN*
"Who would say the rule of law is in good shape in Afghanistan?"'
Introduction
"Rule of Law" is a principle that politicians often discuss to
evaluate the stability and progressive nature of another state. From
the Western point of view-where Rule of Law is most commonly
discussed-Rule of Law is predicated on sovereign, supreme,
predictable, and fair legal systems. Failure to satisfy this formulation
suggests that a state lacks Rule of Law. Rule of Law's absence, in
turn, evokes negative connotations and is often synonymous with a
lack of democracy. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is war-torn,
decentralized, and corrupt-but can it still have Rule of Law? Are
these concepts mutually exclusive? Must Afghanistan's legal
structure function in the same manner as its Western counterparts in
order to have Rule of Law, or does this principle have some practical
flexibility in its application?
This Note contextualizes the Rule of Law analysis in Afghanistan
to more accurately evaluate the Afghan legal system. Part I of this
Note outlines the pluralistic nature of Afghan law, drawing particular
attention to the importance of Shari'a law, custom, the civil code, and,
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1. Martin Krygier, Approaching the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN INACrION 15, 24 (Whit Mason ed., 2011).
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in recent years, the various constitutions. Part II breaks down the
Western conception of Rule of Law and how it applies to
Afghanistan. First, it will begin by noting the various definitions of
Rule of Law and how the principle has developed, rooting back to the
workings of Plato and Aristotle. Second, it will address the role that
the Western world has played in the application, interpretation, and
evaluation of Rule of Law in recent decades. Third, it will discuss the
difficulty of transplanting Rule of Law from one state to another and
the common problems of failing to contextualize a legal system.
Fourth, it will emphasize the existence of Rule of Law in Afghanistan,
albeit one that does not necessarily mirror Rule of Law in the
Western world. And fifth, it will argue that both traditional and
nontraditional systems of justice can establish Rule of Law in a
particular state, provided that the system is particularized to that
state. This Note concludes that while Afghanistan admittedly has
problems with corruption and decentralization, these facts are not
enough to rebut their Rule of Law. Most importantly, this Rule of
Law exists irrespective of whether it fits a strictly Western conception.
I. Afghan Law: A History
Afghanistan's history is a long and complicated one but hardly
something that the Western world understands. The State was
founded in 1747 when Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the Pashtun
tribes.2 As a British colony, Afghanistan served as a geographical
buffer between the British and Russian Empires until gaining
independence in 1919.3 It was in this historical context that
Afghanistan set about creating its first of many constitutions. Until
that time, Afghanistan had never possessed a written constitution.
Instead, it had been informally ruled either by Afghan monarchs,
local tribal leaders, or colonial powers. For centuries, the Afghan
legal system had consisted of a combination of Shari'a law, ancient
Afghan customs such as the jirga5 and Pashtunwali, and their civil
code. Formally, Afghanistan is a civil law state. Unlike states in
2. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACrBOOK: AFGHANISTAN
(INTRODUcTION), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook
/geos/af.html.
3. Great Britain did not accept defeat and loss of control until two years later. See id.
4. MARTIN EWANS, AFGHANISTAN: A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE AND
POLITICS 12, 15-17, 42-70 (2002).
5. A jirga is "a council of tribal elders convened to settle important issues." See
Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3
Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 4,6 (2005).
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which the formal legal power of the state is supreme, the power and
control of Sharl'a, Afghan customs, and the civil code have struggled
to maintain their importance in the Afghan legal system; indeed, "the
power of each has waxed and waned."' Thus, as William Maley, a
distinguished scholar on Afghanistan and its history, has noted,
"[w]hen we come to Afghanistan... we confront a decidedly
confused situation in which it is far from clear that there is any single
rule of recognition on which to rely."' One thing has remained true
as Afghanistan's legal structure has changed over the last few
centuries: its legal system is made up of a complex and delicate
balance between important and competing sources of law.
A. SharVa Law
1. Sharr'a's Variances in Islamic Countries
Sharl'a is Islamic religious law. Roughly translated, it means
"the path or track by which camels were taken to water."8 Practically,
Shari'a provides the path to God through which men may achieve
salvation.' It defines five different categories of acts: obligatory,
suggested, neutral, discouraged, and forbidden.'o Generally, Shari'a is
comprised of two main sources." The first source is the Qur'an.12 A
textual source, the Qur'an is said to have been received by the
Prophet Muhammad from God through Gabriel." It is held to be the
literal word of God.14 The second source is sunnah," which is the life
and practice of Muhammad.
6. Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 60
ME. L. REV. 347, 351 (2008).
7. William Maley, The Rule of Law and the Weight of Politics: Challenges and
Trajectories, in THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN INACTION 61, 66 (Whit
Mason ed., 2011).
8. UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER'S
COMPARATIVE LAW 362, 364 (7th ed. 2009). Other definitions include "the path upon
which the believer has to tread." Lino J. Lauro and Peter A. Samuelson, Toward
Pluralism in Sudan: A Traditionalist Approach, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 114 (Winter 1996).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Lauro, supra note 8, at 114; Liaquat Ali Khan, Jurodynamics of Islamic Law, 61
RUTGERS L. REV. 231, 240 (Winter 2009).
12. MATTEI, supra note 8, at 364-65; Lauro, supra note 8, at 114.
13. Lauro, supra note 8, at 114; Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An Historical
and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and
Quran in Oath Practices in America, 70 OHIO ST. LJ 1, 41 (2009).
14. Lauro, supra note 8, at 114. For a brief history of the development and
significance of the Qur'an, see Milhizer, supra note 13 at 4044.
207Fall 2013] THE AFGHAN LEGAL SYSTEM REANALYZED
The incorporation of Shari'a into modern Islamic states varies.
For example, in Jordan, schools are relatively secular and structured
similarly to those in Western States. For instance, it is possible to
earn a law degree from a Jordanian law school without taking any
courses in Shari'a law." In other states, however-such as
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt-Shari'a is completely
incorporated into society, state laws, and the education system."
2. SharTa and the Ulema in Afghanistan
There is a large class of professional clerics known as ulema who
believe that provincial customary law in Afghanistan is illegitimate
because it strays too far from traditional Sharl'a law." Prior to the
creation of the modern Afghan state in 1919, the ulema often
questioned the legitimacy of customary law practice, alleging that it
conflicted with standard Sharl'a interpretations. The task then fell to
the ulema to issue opinions expressing their interpretation of Shari'a.20
Because roughly eighty percent of Afghans practice Sunni Islam" and
are a part of the Hanafi school of law to which the ulema belong, the
ulema have greatly affected Afghanistan's application and
interpretation of Shari'a. Within the ulema, there are a group of
trained religious judges known as qadi, who, in determining that
religion and government are "inextricably melded," are tasked with
issuing fatwa (opinions on religious issues).22
Until the formation of modern Afghanistan, the ulema
"provid[ed] both the system of laws and the judges to interpret it."23
Secular reforms of the last century, however, have since limited the
ulema's control. But over the last couple decades, particularly with
the control of the Taliban," national legal codes restricting Sharl'a
15. Lauro, supra note 8, at 114.
16. Id.; Milhizer, supra note 13 at 45-46.
17. MATTEI, supra note 8, at 364-65.
18. Toni Johnson & Lauren Vriens, Islam: Governing Under Sharia, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-
sharia/p8034#p4.
19. Barfield, supra note 6, at 352.
20. Id.
21. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: RELIGIONS, available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html.
22. Barfield, supra note 6, at 352.
23. Id.
24. The Taliban rose to power and took control of Afghanistan in the late 1990s.
Travis, supra note 5, at 52. To quote President Hamid Karzai, the "Taliban emerged when
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have been stripped and clerics have been hastily appointed.' The
result has been a lack of legal code and a lack of properly educated
clerics who are capable of understanding the complexities of Sharf'a
to the same extent as the ulema." Thus, the extent of Sharr'a's role
and import within the formal legal system is murky.
However, it is clear that Sharf'a plays some role-indeed, one
that is deeply rooted in Afghan history. In order to apply Sharfi'a, one
must understand the complexities of Sharl'a law itself and how it
interacts with other sources of law. Sharf'a is not merely a set of rules
"that can be formulaically applied by amateurs. A high level of
sophistication is required for a defensible application of Sharf'a, and
[due to the untrained clerics] such sophistication is not readily
available in the Afghan context." 7 This does not mean, however, that
Sharf'a relies on application within a formalized legal system. Even in
the 1980s, when Afghanistan was facing extreme instability within its
formal legal system,28 Shari'a was still respected.29 Sharf'a is so
fundamental to Afghan society that it exists independent and
irrespective of the state's formal legal system.
B. Customary Law
Customary law develops in provincial communities and is "the
means by which local communities resolve disputes in the absence of
(or opposition to) state or religious authority."o Common cultural
and ethical practices establish customary law, and, even as an
unwritten code, it has the power to bind its members. Customary law
varies greatly, depending on the region in rural Afghanistan, and can
Afghans were desperately looking for a savior." Id. at 53. While the Taliban may have
been originally supported (and funded) by the United States and a number of other
countries, the Taliban became a violent, militant, and well-funded group that took control
of Afghanistan by force. Id. at 55-57. Many recent social progressions were reverted and
legal advancements ignored. Id.
25. See generally, Barfield, supra note 6, at 352, 363-68.
26. Id. at 353. See also Thomas Barfield, An Islamic State Is a State Run by Good
Muslims: Religion as a Way of Life and Not an Ideology in Afghanistan, in REMAKING
MUSLIM POLITICs: PLURALISM, CONTESTATION, DEMOCRATIZATION 213, 231-32
(Robert W. Hefner ed., 2005).
27. Maley, supra note 7, at 67 (internal citations omitted).
28. See Marzia Basel and Dana Michael Hollywood, Under a Cruel Sun, 12 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 205,214-17 (2005).
29. Maley, supra note 7, at 67.
30. Barfield, supra note 6, at 351.
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also be manipulated and changed through regime change or through
internal challenges or varying interpretations."
The most elaborate system of Afghan customary law is
Pashtunwali, which is the Pashtun code of conduct. Pashtunwali is an
oral tradition consisting of general principles and practices, known as
tsali (literally, "trail marker"), which are then applied to specific
cases.32  The general premise is that the rules should "generate
behavior [that embodies] the notion of 'doing Pashto,' that is,
enacting cultural values in the real world where they take on specific
forms."33 Pashtunwali requires those involved in a dispute to choose
community members or respected outsiders to serve as fact-finders
and decision-makers. Instead of providing for fines and
imprisonment, Pashtunwali focuses on social reconciliation and on
the most appropriate forms of compensation' for the wrong done.
Social reconciliation can be anything ranging from a public apology to
the community at large to making a payment for sharm" (usually one
sheep and 500 Afghani)." However, in cases of serious violence,
reconciliation can be as extreme as retaliation or revenge, also known
as badal.37 Contrary to Pashtunwali, victims, or the families of victims,
reserve the right to invoke eye-for-an-eye justice, although
communities often attempt to end such disputes quickly so that they
do not cause blood feuds between families." Therefore, relying on
forms of mediation and arbitration is both a strength and weakness of
Pashtunwali.
Reliance on mediation and arbitration can be a problem because
it "generally lacks the power of coercive enforcement. Failures to
resolve serious problems, particularly those involving threats of
31. Id. at 352.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 356.
34. Compensation does not necessarily require monetary fines within this system. Id.
35. Directly translated, sharm means shame, but can also be used merely to indicate
payment for an individual's embarrassing behavior. Id. at 357.
36. Id. The afghani is the basic monetary unit of Afghanistan.
37. Id. at 358.
38. For more information on badal, see Tom Ginsburg, An Economic Interpretation
of Pashtunwali, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 89 (2011); Elizabeth Peterson, Two Sides of the
Same Coin: The Link Between Illicit Opium Production and Security in Afghanistan, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 215 (2007); NABI MISDAQ, AFGHANISTAN: POLITICAL FRAILTY
AND EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE (2008); Honour Among Them, THE ECONOMIST (Dec.
19, 2006), http://www.economist.com/node/8345531.
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bloodshed, therefore often prompt state intervention." 9 Autonomy
and consent to the settlement of a dispute are at the heart of
Pashtunwali. Because badal is a right that cannot be taken away, the
two parties involved in a dispute must voluntarily decide to agree to a
peaceful settlement." However, the parties, or the self-appointed
mediators who are disconnected from the dispute, can initiate
settlement at any point to avoid badal.
The usual setting for settlement is known as a jirga, which is "an
open forum that puts great stress on the nominal equality of the
participants." 4' During a firga, the members sit in a circle (to equalize
all members), and each member has the right to speak. Parties make
decisions by consensus instead of a vote.42 Reaching a consensus may
take days, weeks, or even months.43 Those who disagree with the
opinions of the majority can express their own disagreement or can
leave the jirga to avoid being bound by its decision.' If too many
members leave the jirga, the jirga may collapse. However, the right to
refuse the authority of a jirga is tempered by the fact that it is in the
community's best interest to put an end to blood feuds, because if
"left unresolved, they can lead to an ever-widening circle of revenge
killings over time."45 This coincides well with the jirga's goal of
ending such feuds, because its purpose is to restore harmony in the
community it represents. Granting the jirga power to stop blood
feuds best serves Afghan society's interests; and, relying on the jirga
to stop blood feuds further legitimizes its role and purpose.
Customary codes such as Pashtunwali exemplify the Afghan
preference for a legal system that does not include state-controlled
dispute resolution. As William Maley has noted, codes like
Pashtunwali "reflect the predominance in many parts of Afghanistan
of governance rather than government: 'governance structures enjoy
local legitimacy even without having received the imprimatur of the
state."'46 Those of a particular region can have complete, or near
39. Barfield, supra note 6, at 352.
40. Thomas Barfield, Neamat Nojumi & J. Alexander Thier, The Clash of Two
Goods: State and Nonstate Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN WAR-TORN SOCIETIES 159, 166 (Deborah H. Isser ed., 2011).
41. Id. The word jirga is a Pashto word derived from the Turkish word for circle.
42. Id. at 167.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 168.
46. Maley, supra note 7, at 68 (emphasis in original).
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complete, confidence in the available local remedy without involving
the state. These disputes would, however, be "individually grounded,
based on norms of revenge and giving rise to the risk of blood feuds;
ostracism from the tribe [functions] as an ultimate sanction."4 Not
only does the "civilized" world admonish such remedies as morally
repugnant, more practically, they likely violate Afghanistan's
international human rights obligations.'
C. The Civil Code
1. Reformation in Afghanistan Begins
The evolution of the formal civil code in Afghanistan began in
the 1880s when Emir Abdur Rahman began the first phase of
reformation in Afghanistan, creating a uniform state with a national
army, defined borders, and a centralized government." Emir
Rahman believed that a coherent, defined legal system was the key to
a strong, centralized state structure; thus, he adopted a code of
procedures and ethics in 1885, known as the Asas al-quzat
("Fundamentals for Judges")."o The Asas al-quzat established that
the Hanafi school of Shari'a should be the basis of judicial decisions,
which allowed Emir Rahman to nest his authority and administrative
reform within divine right. He essentially "simultaneously
empowered the clergy, by making [Sharl'a] the law of the land, and
subordinated it to his executive authority."" Because the Emir was
able to create the code himself and could justify it through Sharl'a, he
had a great deal of latitude to expand his own power and the formal
legal system without alarming the populace.
In addition to the Emir's redefinition of the legal system, Abdur
Rahman also significantly influenced the functions and development
of the judiciary. First, he required all judges of the qadi be vetted and
appointed, ensuring that anyone appointed would serve the Emir's
will.52 Further, some areas of jurisdiction-such as commerce-were
taken from the qadi and given to newly established district courts.
Provincial administrators ran the district courts, which eventually
47. Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. See generally World Report 2012: Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan.
2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-afghanistan.
49. Barfield et al., supra note 40, at 175.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 176.
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became the forum for criminal law, commerce, and taxation." This
created a tension in the new dichotomous court system; a constant
struggle for jurisdiction and authority between the executive and the
religious right still exists today. Nevertheless, Abdur Rahman began
to question customary law principles, thus reforming tribal practice
and causing further tension."
2. The Second Phase of Afghan Reformation: Rural Resistance
The second phase of reform for the formal legal system began
with the first constitution." The new Emir, Amanullah, instituted
Afghanistan's first penal code in 1924." There were also several
attempts to incorporate Hanafi jurisprudence into civil codes, largely
modeled after Egyptian and Turkish law." Typical of a civil law
system, these codifications significantly limited judicial discretion."
Even at the height of its power, however, the centralized state never
had the ability to enforce the legal code nationwide." Officials in
rural areas continued to apply customary law in their districts,
regardless of whether it conflicted with the legal code.6' According to
Maley, "[i]n theory, state law has always applied to all residents of
Afghanistan equally, but, in practice, government institutions were
found almost exclusively in urban areas and in provincial centres [sic]
of administration."" In fact, the government's courts were often a
threat used against reluctant parties in a dispute: If they did not settle
the dispute, they would have to involve the government courts.62
Ultimately, rural areas, which have historically constituted roughly
eighty percent of Afghanistan, continued to apply Sharl'a and
customary law-instead of respecting the code-both because those
forms of law worked for them and because no enforcement
mechanism was in place to make use of the government's civil
system.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 177.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Barfield, supra note 6, at 353.
60. Id.
61. Maley, supra note 7, at 68.
62. Barfield, supra note 6, at 353.
63. Id.
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D. Modern Afghanistan and Its Constitutions
1. Afghanistan's First Constitution
In 1923, after Afghanistan gained independence from Great
Britain, the first Afghan constitution was born." Emir Amaullah
Khan secured ratification of the new Constitution by a loya jirga, 6 a
form of jirga usually reserved for important political events like
choosing a new king or, in this case, ratifying a constitution." The
new constitution provided greater rights for women and religious
minorities than ever before. Most notably, it guaranteed that "all
subjects of Afghanistan have equal rights and duties to the country in
accordance with Shari'a and the law's [sic] of the state."6 It abolished
torture, slavery, and forced labor; it created a legislature, made
elementary education compulsory, and provided state protection to
followers of religions other than Islam."
This ambitious document, however, essentially created a modern
theocratic government by vesting authority in leaders who claimed to
know the will of God. The 1923 Constitution made the king the
"servant and protector of the true religion of Islam,"'9 required the
legislature to give particular consideration to Shari'a law,o and
required the judiciary to settle all disputes in accordance with
principles of Sharl'a law, with general civil and criminal law to serve
as subsidiary sources of law, in that the courts were required to settle
disputes "in accordance with the principles of [Sharl'a]."71  The
religious elite, intent on protecting customary law, summarily
denounced attempts to introduce legislative reforms, which led to the
Emir calling a loya jirga to amend the constitution.72 After Emir
Amanullah became the king in 1926, he attempted to implement
64. Barfield et al., supra note 40, at 176.
65. Loya jirga is a Pashto term meaning "grand council." Q&A: What is a loya jirga?,
BBC NEWS (July 1, 2002,21:22 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouthasia/1782079.stm.
66. For information on the role of the loya jirga in Afghanistan, see id.
67. NIZAMNAMAH-YE-ASASI-E-DAULAT-E-ALIYAH-E-AFGHANISTAN. [THE
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] 20 Hamal 1302 [Apr. 9, 1923], art. 16 [hereinafter 1923
CONSTITUTION]. See also Travis, supra note 5, at 3.
68. Travis, supra note 5, at 8.
69. 1923 CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at art. 5.
70. Id. at art. 72.
71. Id. at art. 21.
72. EWANS, supra note 4, at 93-94. Amendments included declaring the Hanafi
school of Islamic Law the official religious rite of Afghanistan, decreasing protection for
women's rights, reintroducing torture in accordance with Shar-'a law, and allowing a
Council of Islamic Scholars to review any proposed new laws. See Travis, supra note 5, at 4.
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further reforms to protect women's rights, but the religious elite
rejected such reforms and his successors overturned them.73
2. Afghanistan's Second Constitution
In 1930, a loya jirga pronounced that Nadir Shah was
Afghanistan's new king. In 1931, King Shah created the second
Afghan constitution, which was significantly more socially progressive
than the 1923 Constitution.74  It retained many of the 1923
Constitution's reforms and added a national parliament with
legislative power, "consisting of an elected National Consultative
Assembly and a royally appointed upper House of Nobles, and made
the ministers responsible to parliament."7  However, the 1931
Constitution failed to protect the women's rights introduced in the
1923 Constitution and required the king to rule according to the
tenets of Sharl'a law.76 As before, the judiciary consisted of a secular
and religious court, but now the secular court was required to apply
Hanafi jurisprudence. The resulting system was disorganized and
contradictory.
After King Shah's assassination in 1933, his nineteen-year-old
son became king, but the new king's uncle served as prime minister
through the end of World War II. It was only after the war that the
1931 Constitution's provisions providing for democratic election were
actually used.78 "The new liberal parliament enacted a free press law
and ushered in a lively democratic period," but due to the high level
of illiteracy, universal suffrage resulted in landlord dominance in the
Afghan parliament. 79  The following decade was one of oppressive
government, resulting in the king persuading the prime minister to
resign in 1963. The new prime minister was responsible for preparing
a new constitution.8
73. Travis, supra note 5, at 4. Afghanistan has been consistently criticized for its
record with respect to women's rights, which is often seen as an indication of the state's
failure overall. See Nancy Gallagher, The Ethical and Legal Issues Surrounding Systematic
Gender and Race Discrimination, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 367 (2000-2001).
74. Barfield et al., supra note 40, at 177.
75. Said Amir Arjomand, Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A
Comparative and Historical Perspective, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 943, 948 (2004-2005).
76. Id. at 949.
77. Id. at 949-50. See also Louis DUPREE, AFGHANISTAN 468 (1980).
78. Arjomand, supra note 75, at 950.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 951.
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3. Afghanistan's Third Constitution
The Constitution of 1964 arose from a series of committees,
culminating in a loya firga that included six women. Progressive
features of the prior constitutions were enhanced, with a bicameral
parliament," a Supreme Court,82 and an Attorney General's office to
investigate crimes." Further, while laws still had to conform to
Shari'a law, it was the secular National Center for Legislation in the
Ministry of Justice that was responsible for determining the
constitutionality of proposed legislation.' Further, Hanafi
jurisprudence was only valid in the absence of statutory law.
Overall, the 1964 Constitution "ushered in nearly a decade of
democratic politics, with a flourishing free press, student
demonstrations, and political mobilization."" However, the
democratic period ended with the overthrowing of the king in 1973,
after which Mohammad Daoud Khan established a new republic with
himself as President. President Khan was then overthrown in 1977.
During the civil war that followed, Communist and Islamist groups
offered their own written constitutions that represented their
respective ideals." While President Najiballah promulgated an
incredibly progressive constitution in 1987, that constitution was
replaced after he was overthrown in 1992.9 Additionally, when the
Taliban became the dominant power in 1996, they disregarded the
recent history of constitutionalism. However, in 2001, the United
States invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban, temporarily
restoring the 1964 Constitution through the Bonn Agreement, which
allowed for a working constitution to be in place while a new one was
being drafted."
81. ASSASI QANUN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] 9 Mizan 1343 [Oct. 1, 1964],
arts. 44-45.
82. Id. at art. 105.
83. Id. at art. 103.
84. DUPREE, supra note 77, at 579-80.
85. Id. at 579.
86. Arjomand, supra note 75, at 953.
87. Id. at 954.
88. Id. at 953-54.
89. Id. The 1993 Constitution was, however, never promulgated because those in
society other than the governmental leaders opposed it. Id. at 954.
90. Id. at 955.
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4. Afghanistan's Fourth Constitution
This progression of constitutional reform has led to the drafting
and promulgation of the 2004 Constitution, which remains the current
Constitution in place in Afghanistan.9' Given the state of the Afghan
government and the recent devastation from a civil war that had
raged for twenty-three years, the process of drafting the new
constitution was far less notable this time around, with minimal public
debate and publicity, such that many rural men and women were not
even aware that there was a new Constitution.'
The 2004 Constitution does, however, have a number of positive
features, at least from a Western-centric, democratic point of view.
First, it establishes a presidential system with a centralized
administration." Second, it mandates that the one-third of the
parliament's upper house-all of whom are appointed by the
president-be split evenly between men and women.94 Third, it
provides that the remaining two-thirds of parliament's upper house
must be indirectly elected.95 Fourth, the constitution provides for
more ethnic, cultural, and religious pluralism." While Dari and
Pushtu are the official State languages, the constitution recognizes six
other languages as official when they are predominant in particular
regions, and "Article 43 makes provisions for supporting teaching
each language in schools in the relevant regions."" Perhaps more
significantly, Article 45 requires religious school instructors to
consider Islamic sects existing in Afghanistan during their teachings,
which is a drastic change from previous religious tradition." While
this constitution is not perfect and some scholars argue it lacks the
secular constitutional reviews of the 1964 Constitution," the balance
of religious tradition and constitutional protection has continued to
develop and will likely continue to do so in the future. Afghanistan's
91. Id.
92. National Human Development Report 2004: Afghanistan, United Nations Dev.
Programme, Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities 128 (2004), available
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/afghanistan/Afghanistan_2004_en.pdf.
93. CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, Jan. 3,2004, arts.
136-37 [hereinafter the 2004 CONSTITUTION].
94. Id. at art. 84.
95. Id. at arts. 83-84.
96. Id. at arts. 110.
97. Arjomand, supra note 75, at 957.
98. CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, art. 45.
99. Arjomand, supra note 75, at 960-61.
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current constitution is workable, even if it does not include everything
the Western world would expect.'00
II. The (Un)Importance of a Formal Rule of Law
It is within the lens of the particular circumstances of Afghan law
that the definition and implementation of Rule of Law should be
analyzed. While Rule of Law is said to benefit all of society-and
failure to have Rule of Law suggests a failed, anarchic state-such a
view has been initiated and perpetuated from a Western-centric point
of view, which is an inappropriate lens through which to examine and
evaluate Afghan law. As illustrated above, the rich and complex
body of law in Afghanistan is shockingly different from the sources of
law in the Western world. Thus, the appropriate legal structure need
not look like the Western structure in order to be effective. In fact,
the interplay of different sources of law in Afghanistan strongly
suggests that a Western-centric lens would be an ill fit. The Afghan
legal structure may be different, but that does not end the inquiry of
whether Rule of Law exists.
A. Rule of Law
1. An Introduction to Rule of Law
Rule of Law is often defined negatively in that it "is typically
invoked as a contrast term, to be compared with life without it."'o1
F. A. Hayek, a classic liberalism theorist, suggested that Rule of Law
is a "metalegal rather than legal principle, a normative political ideal
by which real-world systems could be appraised and evaluated."'" It
finds its historical roots as far back as any civilized society exists and
suggests that society without formalized law would be something
detestably similar to anarchy. Rule of Law has been linked with the
stability and prosperity of both a state and its individuals, as noted by
Plato: "Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none
of its own, the collapse of the state .. . is not far off; but if law is the
master of the government and the government is its slave, then the
situation is full of promise.""o'
100. See infra Part III.D.
101. Krygier, supra note 1, at 16.
102. Maley, supra note 7, at 62 (emphasis in original).
103. PLATO, LAWS 174 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Classics 1970) (355-347
B.C.E.).
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2. Rule of Law "Defined"
There is no universally accepted definition for Rule of Law, as it
has meant different things to different people at different times.
However, Joseph Raz, one of the most prominent advocates of legal
positivism, has identified eight key components of Rule of Law:
All laws should be prospective, open and clear; laws
should be relatively stable; the making of particular
laws (particular legal orders) should be guided by
open, stable, clear and general rules; the independence
of the judiciary must be guaranteed; the principles of
natural justice must be observed; the courts should
have review powers over the implementation of the
other principles; the courts should be easily accessible;
the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should
not be allowed to pervert the law."
Raz was careful to note that the appearance of judicial
independence would not be enough-the judiciary actually has to be
independent.o
Other theorists, however, do not outline Rule of Law in such
great detail. For example, scholars such as Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono
posit that it incorporates four basic principles: first, power is not
exercised arbitrarily; second, law is supreme and independent; third,
law is applied equally; and fourth, domestic law incorporates
universal human rights.'" Still others, such as Martin Krygier, suggest
that Rule of Law exists when there is a sufficient scope, character,
application and social salience in the law.07 At the very least,
Western Rule of Law can be traced back to the writings of Oxford
legal scholar A.V. Dicey who "not only argued for the importance of
what he called 'conventions of the constitution' but also developed an
account of the Rule of Law which required that law be ascertainable,
prospective, and enforced by a distinct judiciary."",0
Regardless of the definition, Rule of Law is "bound up with all
those fundamental aspects of a state and society that determine the
104. Maley, supra note 7, at 63.
105. Id.
106. Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications
for the European Union and the United States, 72 U. Prrr. L. REV. 229, 231 (2010).
107. Krygier, supra note 1, at 28.
108. Maley, supra note 7, at 62 (internal citations omitted).
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extent to which it is rational for a person to behave civilly and within
the law."'" For purposes of examining whether Afghanistan's legal
system amounts to Rule of Law, a composite definition should be
employed. Accordingly, Rule of Law will be said to exist where a
legal system is predictable, justly enforced, relied upon by society,
and predicated on relevant morality particular to a given state.
3. How Rule of Law is Applied
If a state wants to implementno Rule of Law, the state must
consider the form of law (e.g., civil or common) and the institutions
required for implementing that form of law. Thus, in practical terms,
Rule of Law, at least as understood in the Western world, is often
equated with democracy or Americanization. But it is also important
to consider the existing law as it is, and how that existing system can
be crafted into Rule of Law. As part of this step, the crafting and
application of Rule of Law must be contextualized within the
particular state, because not all states are perfectly alike. Perhaps the
most important contextual element to consider when analyzing Rule
of Law is the culture of the particular state."' As Rule of Law
theorists have aptly noted, "[n]orms, routine expectations, common
understandings and reactions that are 'second nature' are all of
crucial importance, and these are commonly encoded in and
transmitted by culture."112 Therefore, the stability in local tradition
and culture often generates strength in the law.
Culture, however, is also often blamed for why a particular
state's implementation of Rule of Law has failed. Failure of Rule of
Law is often explained by a "lack of 'legal culture,' 'civil culture' or
just having a culture without the right 'cultural' elements and full of
the wrong ones.""' Culture appears to serve a dual and somewhat
contradictory purpose. Irrespective of this contradiction, it is
109. Krygier, supra note 1, at 30.
110. Arguably, at least in this author's opinion, Rule of Law is not something to be
"implemented," but is rather something a society has. "Implementation"-a common
word used for the transplantation of Rule of Law-implies that Rule of Law can be forced
into a society by structuring their legal system in a way that models the Western world. In
this author's opinion, this runs counter to the premise of Rule of Law, because one size
does not, in fact, fit all. Different states will require different things from their legal
structure, and they should be allowed to tailor that structure to their needs.
111. Yes, this is an unconscionably vague statement, which is part of the problem with
the implementation of Western-centric notions of Rule of Law. See infra Part III.D.
112. Krygier, supra note 1, at 30.
113. Id. at 29.
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generally accepted that "rule of law is not something that exists
'beyond culture' and that can be somehow added to an existing
culture by the simple expedient of creating formal structures and
rewriting constitutions and statutes."114 Any adjustments to a state's
legal structure must consider the particular culture of that state,
because failure to do so will inevitably lead to failure of Rule of Law.
An individual and contextual analysis is, therefore, necessary.
Once Rule of Law is established, there is still variance in its
application. A dichotomy has developed between clearly defined
components within the law and attenuated components.
Furthermore, there seems to be disagreement as to how Rule of Law
should govern. Weighing in on this dichotomy at a very early stage,
Aristotle noted:
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign;
and personal rule, whether it be exercised by a single
person or a body of persons, should be sovereign only
in those matters on which law is unable, owing to the
difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies,
to make an exact pronouncement."'
Aristotle's opinion on this dichotomy has since influenced the
writings of modern jurists. In his seminal essay on the importance of
Rule of Law, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia discussed the
dichotomy between the general Rule of Law and personal discretion
in justice that Aristotle so aptly noted."' While Justice Scalia may
have originally believed that the highest court should confer
discretion upon the lower courts, instead of establishing a general rule
that must be applied,"' he has been of the opinion that clear general
principles of decision provide predictability."8 At least in the context
of the judiciary, uncertainty is incompatible with Rule of Law."9 As
114. Id.
115. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK III, CHAPTER XI, § 19, at 127 (Ernest Barker
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946) (350 B.C.E.).
116. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
117. Id. at 1177.
118. Id. at 1179.
119. Id. This opinion is, of course, expressed in the context of a common law system,
which differs from the civil law system of Afghanistan. However, the narrow perspective
on the Rule of Law still exemplifies how Rule of Law is interpreted in the Western world
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he states, "[t]here are times when even a bad rule is better than no
rule at all."120 For Rule of Law to be effective, general principles
established by a court should extend as far as possible in interpreting
a particular statutory or constitutional provision. The scope of such
rules, therefore, will depend on the judicial understanding of the rules
that govern-namely, a clear understanding of the particular statute
or constitutional provision."'
Justice Scalia's essay rests upon one very clear premise: Before a
judiciary can decide whether it wishes to convey some level of
discretion to lower courts, there must be established laws to apply.
Thus, Rule of Law requires a clearly established and predictable body
of law that may then be interpreted or applied by a judicial body.
This formulation assumes that no Rule of Law can exist unless the
formal legal system is well-defined, articulated in a manner that can
be understood by the layman, and adhered to by society at large. At
the end of the day, at least from a Western-centric perspective:
The concept of the rule of law . . . has to do with the
way power is exercised .... [T]hat between
circumstances in which power can be exercised
arbitrarily and those where law ... plays a real role in
channeling the exercise of power, and in particular in
constraining the possibility of its arbitrary exercise.122
Thus, failure to have such a legal system, or to have one that is
arbitrary or corrupt in its exercise of power, indicates that Rule of
Law has also failed.
B. The Role of the Western World in Rule of Law
As previously stated, the modern conception of Rule of Law
likely derives from ancient European political thought, found in
Greek and Roman philosophy. Current Rule of Law of both the
European Union and the United States stems from the works of these
philosophers. For example, Plato opined on the universal application
and respect for law and society in stating that "the laws that are not
at large; the assumption is that something other than a formal judicial system would be
unworkable unless those subject to the system understand what the system prescribes. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1183-84.
122. Krygier, supra note 1, at 26-27.
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established for the good of the whole state are bogus law.""
Aristotle further added that "what is just will be both what is lawful
and what is fair, and what is unjust will be both what is lawless and
what is unfair."124 In particular, Aristotle firmly believed that
sovereignty of law was the best way to avoid and combat the highly
detestable situation of popular tyranny in a democracy. He believed
that tyrannical democracy resulted in law that was "open to the
objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws have no
authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme
overall, and the magistracies and government should judge of
particulars." 25
It is this basic principle-that law should be supreme and
sovereign-upon which Western Rule of Law has been built. The
United States and European Union, while differing to an extent,
share both common history and basic principles: power must not be
exercised arbitrarily; law is supreme; equality of the law is paramount;
and there must be a respect for individual rights.'" The application of
these principles, however, does vary.
In Europe, for example, individual member states with
admittedly different incorporations of sovereignty, constitutions, and
individual rights in their domestic legislation were able to agree on
general principles to represent what is known as pan-European Rule
of Law. What binds these states together as one European society
under one law is that the states were able to look beyond the
differences between their legal systems and recognize the similar
ideals and justifications for their respective laws. When one considers
the "philosophical and political assumptions behind such
diversities ... they give way to a great number of similar legal
institutions and political structures which provide a basis for a
genuine pan-European rule of law acceptable to all European
states."12 7
123. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 233 (quoting PLATO, LAWS 174 (Trevor J.
Saunders trans., Penguin Classics 1970) (355-347 B.C.E.)).
124. Id. (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS 117 (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1985) (350 B.C.E.)).
125. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK IV 89 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (350 B.C.E.).
126. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 231-32.
127. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 259-60.
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The Treaty on the European Union is commonly viewed as the
European Union's codification of the Rule of Law.12 Article Two of
this treaty provides:
[T]he Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule
of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values
are common to the member states in a society in which
pluralism, non discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and equality between women and men
prevail.'
If this article codifies Rule of Law for the European Union,
several important implications arise. Article Two implies that Rule of
Law is a necessary component of the amalgam that binds the
European Union. In turn, Article Two suggests that tolerance,
justice, and equality are necessary elements of Rule of Law. By
extension, it would appear that a society could have Rule of Law
without meeting a list of criteria established by the Western world,
provided that society shares the values articulated within Article Two.
In essence, these enumerated principles-human dignity, non-
discrimination, tolerance, etc.-are indispensible components of Rule
of Law.
Because American Jurisprudence shares the same roots as its
European counterpart, there exist similar assumptions within
American Rule of Law. Modern political theorists such as John
Locke and Thomas Jefferson have helped shape the fundamentals
upon which the American legal system rests. Due to this influence,
some would argue that American law "incorporates the most radical
principles of individualism and liberty ever known to man ...
[proclaiming that] people have certain fundamental and inherent
rights such as life, liberty, property ownership, and the pursuit of
happiness. These rights have been endowed by 'nature and God,' and
not by government."' 0 Inherent in these expressly afforded rights is
128. Id. at 260. See also Laurent Pech, The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle
of the European Union 20 (Jean Monnet Working Paper Series No. 4/2009, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1463242.
129. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 2, Mar. 30, 2010, OJ. (C 83) 17.
130. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 272.
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the necessity of a strong Rule of Law to maintain them. Without a
predictable and stable legal system, such rights could not be
guaranteed. This is perhaps why Rule of Law "has acquired a central
position in American law to the point where the rule of law has
become a 'veritable civil religion.'"
Arguably, the clearest codification of Rule of Law in the United
States Constitution is in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
incorporated to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due
Process Clause guarantees that individuals shall not be deprived of
one of those rights Americans hold so dear-life, liberty, or
property-without due process of law.132  This protection of life,
liberty, and property provides procedural and substantive protection
to all persons, citizens or otherwise, within United States territory.'
In Solesbee v. Balkcom, for example, the Supreme Court noted that it
is:
[A] settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process
Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and
feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to
a civilized society as conceived by our whole history.
Due process is that which comports with the deepest
notions of what is fair and right and just."'34
The principles underlying Due Process are the same principles
behind the more general Western Rule of Law: predictability,
equality, supremacy, and independence of law. Without the Fifth
Amendment, American Rule of Law would neither be as stable nor
would it represent the most radical and stringent application of Rule
of Law; under the American system, law must be written in some
form, be it through adjudicatory decisions, statutes, regulations, or
constitutional provisions. Indeed, under an American view-and
indeed the Western way overall-a law is not the law unless it is
written down, allowing those words to be consistently interpreted and
applied.
Both the European and American approaches to and
interpretations of Rule of Law suggest that without Rule of Law,
131. Id.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 275.
134. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950).
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chaos would ensue-that the only manner in which modern, civilized
society may continue is if it controls and fiercely protects the law
upon which society is based. While this statement may be hyperbolic
to an extent, the transplantation of Western legal systems-that is,
the procedure of instituting Westernized legal systems in non-
Western states, namely those "without" Rule of Law-evidences the
West's intent to civilize the rest of the world through the
dissemination of Western Rule of Law. To wit, in order to preserve
the Western legal order, the Western world must find a way for other
countries to acquiesce to the Western Rule of Law.
C. Implementation of Rule of Law: Do the Ends Justify the Means?
Why would a state want a Rule of Law? Rule of Law
proponents note that contemporary societies lacking Rule of Law are
hardly desirable.13' While there are many ways in which
contemporary polity can lack the formalistic Rule of Law, two in
particular are worth noting. First, a state can have rule without law,
meaning that the exercise of power is completely without legal
authorization."' This system would function with a tyrannical or
despotic leader, or as a failed state, in which "neither the people nor a
single person or group rules."137 Second, a state can have rule by law,
which arises when law is developed and used as a way to repress
society.3 8 In this way, law is used against, rather than for, society and
allows the "exercise of unrestrained and uncivilized power.""'9 The
result is a system in which those capable of effectuating change are
those who would have the most to lose if formal Rule of Law were
established; thus it is incredibly difficult to force change upon them.
These examples of systems that would emerge if no Rule of Law
existed certainly serve as cautionary tales of why Rule of Law is so
important and why states that lack Rule of Law would want to model
their legal systems after the Western world. Stability, predictability,
trustworthiness, and security are-after all-desirable traits in a
government. The implementation of such traits, however, is not an
easy process. First, Rule of Law is not merely an installable
135. See, e.g., Maley, supra note 7, at 61-62; Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 231;
FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: THE EUROPEAN WAY 7 (2007).
136. Krygier, supra note 1, at 16.
137. Id. at 17.
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id.
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technology." It is not a tool that can be transplanted from one state
to another. Furthermore, if Rule of Law is to be equated with a
transplantable technology, at the very least it is an "interaction
technology," which means it is "harder to transplant [and] harder to
generate.... Patterns of interaction and interactional contexts vary
dramatically between societies. If you want to affect them, it is now
coming to be admitted, you can't assume that institutions that work in
one place will work similarly in another." 141
If Rule of Law is to be transplanted from the Western world into
a society that "lacks" it, it must adjust to the society upon which it is
being thrust. As expected, complications arise. It is not as if every
society is ready and willing to have a formal legal system imposed. In
some countries, where Rule of Law has not "existed" for some time,
formal law is "thought of as 'like a door in the middle of an open
meadow. Of course, you could go through the door, but why bother?'
Such ingrained dismissiveness presents a challenge to an architect
who would like his building to be used-even better, useful."1 42
D. An Afghan Version of Rule of Law
Unlike the Western conception of Rule of Law and much to the
Western world's consternation, Sharl'a is supreme under Islamic Law.
This flies directly in the face of the American and European
formulations of Rule of Law because in the United States and
Europe, law itself should rule and that law should be secular and
independent from social influence. 143 Therefore, under the Western
view, there is no Rule of Law in Afghanistan. Is this actually true,
however? Or is it only true under a narrow, Western-centric
interpretation of Rule of Law?
There are a few indications that Afghanistan does have a robust
Rule of Law. It has manifested in a way that differs from Rule of
Law in the Western world. In fact, Afghanistan's constitution of 627
A.D. is considered the first written constitution in the world,
established by the Prophet Muhammed himself." Additionally,
Shari'a recognizes individual rights that are very similar to those
140. Id. at 21.
141. Id. at 22.
142. Id. at 23.
143. See Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 287 ("In Western constitutionalism,
democracy and the separation of powers presuppose secularism and this is not acceptable
to Islamic democracy.").
144. Gosalbo-Bono, supra note 106, at 285.
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protected within Europe or the United States: "life, property, legal
process, and individual rights arising from the relationship between
individuals and the Islamic state."'45 In terms of the rights to be
recognized and respected by society, Sharl'a law (and Afghan law in
general) is not dissimilar from the Western world. Rather, it is
merely the enforcement mechanisms that differ.
Regardless of similarities, Western Rule of Law theorists have
difficulty acknowledging that Rule of Law exists in Afghanistan. The
West's emphasis on the law's independence from social or religious
influence suggests to the Western world that Rule of Law cannot exist
without this division. However, the Afghan legal system and Rule of
Law are not mutually exclusive concepts-the two may exist with
each other. The only meaningful difference between Western and
Afghan Rules of Law may, after all, be in how each region
implements it's respective legal regime.
In fact, Shari'a may draw Rule of Law into a deeper, more
fundamental role in society than what exists in the Western world.
This is due to the fact that Sharl'a is not merely a set of legal rules;
rather, Sharl'a directly links the law, and its obedience, to the divine.
It represents "a set of unchanging beliefs and principles that order life
in accordance with the will of God and the idea that all human beings,
and all human governments, are subject to justice under the law of
God."'" Principles underlying Sharli'a are thus constant and unlikely
to be influenced by changes in political regime or opinion, which
makes Islamic Law systems generally more predicable and reliable
over time.
One could, therefore, argue that Rule of Law in Islamic states is
rooted more deeply in society than in its secular, Western
counterparts. This secularism would not be acceptable in an Islamic
democracy, even one that is completely stable and would otherwise
meet the Western definition of Rule of Law. Many Islamic states, for
example, see the Western conception of democracy as:
[A] 'doctrine or procedure, a mere method of
dispensing, sharing and managing political power and
secularism, nationalism and alike.' According to these
Islamic scholars, secularism is not an inevitable
consequence of democracy: free elections, political
parties, individual freedoms, and human rights can co-
145. Id. at 285-86.
146. Id.
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exist within an Islamic constitution which upholds the
basic principles of the Islamic faith.'47
It follows that if Western democracy, and indeed Western Rule
of Law, is one acceptable method of dispensing the law, the system in
Islamic states is yet another acceptable method. Sharl'a itself, or the
pluralistic nature of the law in Afghanistan, does not preclude
Afghanistan from having Rule of Law. Perhaps only Afghan conduct
with respect to that system of law would dictate whether Rule of Law
truly exists.
E. Traditional and Nontraditional Justice Systems, and Why They
Work
Contrary to common Western beliefs, it is actually possible to
have Rule of Law without a completely formalistic system. While
Afghanistan's formal legal system is relatively crippled and not
generally relied upon by the populace, the informal forms of justice,
through the jirga for example, are still used and relied upon, serving
the same function as a formal system. There are, of course, problems
with informal justice. For example, Maley recounts a visit to northern
Afghanistan during which he observed a provincial qadi issue an
opinion on a commercial dispute. 4' He notes that the qadi was
applying Hanafi Sunni jurisprudence, but he had been appointed by
the local warlord and had no judicial authority over the case. Maley
uses this example to show that there is no single rule to apply in
Afghanistan, which severely undercuts its Rule of Law.149 However,
Maley also notes that the parties in the dispute were happy to accept
the judge's authority and decision.' Thus, if the opinion of those
who participate in-and suffer the consequences of-the legal system
bears any weight, informal justice is both effective and preferable in
some cases. Certainly, it satisfies the definition of Rule of Law, in
that it is justly enforced, at least in the view of the parties, relied upon
by society, and based on society's preferred morals. The weakest
argument for an Afghan Rule of Law would be that of predictability,
because judges' decisions may vary from case to case and do not
necessarily apply the same rules and standards each time. However,
the reliance of the parties and the belief that the judge's decision is
147. Id. at 287.
148. Maley, supra note 7, at 66.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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just weigh heavily in favor of such a system signifying Rule of Law.
Ultimately, society's perception of the legal system may be the best
indicator of the presence of Rule of Law.
Unfortunately, individual Afghans' opinions have minimal
influence on which state-controlled legal system exists. In 2001, the
Bonn Agreement "provided the foundation for the reconstitution of
political authority, a process that led to the adoption of the 2004
constitution embodying international human rights standards, and to
the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and
2005."1" However, Afghan citizens at large did not seem to recognize
these newly implemented institutions and rules, particularly given the
attenuated control that the central government had over provincial
life.152 According to Maley, "the legitimacy of state-based law cannot
simply be assumed; it is up to the state to ensure that it is applied in
such a way as to satisfy ordinary people's craving for meaningful
justice."' This "craving," to use Maley's word, could be completely
satisfied by the informal justice options enshrined in Afghan history,
if only the rest of the world would allow it.
In an effort to assert the availability of "meaningful justice,"
developments of the state-controlled legal system in recent years have
led to an incorporation of an informal justice sector within the formal
legal structure. This sector "enjoys no particular formal standing but
may be the preferred choice for ordinary people seeking to solve
problems." 15 4 According to Maley, this pluralistic system creates a
"quandary," because while the Afghans trust the informal systems
more, these systems are under suspicion due to their possible
tendency to undermine human rights."' There is also evidence of
corruption within the state courts, suggesting that they are not a
reliable source for Rule of Law."' Recent recommendations consist
of using the informal justice sector instead of the state system,
151. Id. at 69.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 70.
155. Id. at 70. Maley notes that in a 2009 survey, 69% of respondents believed the
state courts were accessible, compared to 79% who thought the local firga was accessible.
Further, 50% said state courts were fair or trusted, compared to 72% for the local firga.
Id.
156. Id.
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provided that it can be augmented in a way that will not violate
Afghanistan's international human rights obligations.'
Afghanistan's judicial system is currently under an immense
amount of pressure. Failure to meet the Western world's
expectations, particularly those of efficiency and transparency, is part
of the reason the Western world appears to believe Afghanistan lacks
Rule of Law." First, the Bonn Declaration resulted in a demand for
fair, just, and formal dispute resolution-a feat that presently
challenges many states. 9 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
Afghan system must be evaluated with its attendant circumstances;
for over two decades, Afghanistan has experienced internal
population displacement (including the fleeing of millions Afghans as
refugees)." With many of those refugees returning and finding their
former property seized by other individuals, the Afghan legal system
is flooded with complex property disputes that would overwhelm any
state.'
No legal system should be analyzed out of context and failure to
consider context would be a flaw in a Rule of Law analysis.
Nonetheless, this is a recurring flaw that appears frequently in
Western critics' analyses. The general conclusion has thus been that
the failure of the state-controlled system to properly handle these
cases necessarily implicates a lack of Rule of Law.1 62 But this
conclusion is incorrect and unwarranted because any legal system,
regardless of how sophisticated, may become overwhelmed by crises.
An inability to process such claims in a speedy manner should not be
equated with a lack of Rule of Law because that logic would
necessarily lead to the absurd conclusion that the United States," the
157. Id. It should be noted, however, that violations of international human rights
obligations are not limited to "failed states" in which the Western world does not
recognize Rule of Law. Violations of international human rights, for example as
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are violated quite
frequently, as we can see through the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee,
which is the governing body of the Covenant. See generally, David Sloss, The
Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and
Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999).
158. See, e.g., Krygier, supra note 1, at 24.
159. Maley, supra note 7, at 70-71.
160. Id. at 71.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Amanda Lee Myers, Overwhelmed Courts Need $40 million for Border Plan,
AZCENTRAL.COM (June 29, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010
106/29/20100629arizona-immigration-federal-court-costs.html.
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United Kingdom,'" or even the European Union in general"' also
lacks Rule of Law.
At the very least'" the Afghan legal system shows that Rule of
Law exists in Afghanistan, even if it may not be the exact formulation
as found in the Western World. Using the elements identified by Raz
as an example, such a system would fail under the currently
accepted definitions of Rule of Law. There are no written laws, let
alone those that are prospective, open, and clear. The application is
relatively arbitrary in application. There is no indication that the
decisions of a qadi would be subject to review. In just two facts, it is
already clear that the pluralistic Afghan legal system looks nothing
like Western Rule of Law.
Most importantly, however, Afghans rely on informal justice as
their primary means of seeking resolution of disputes and a sense of
equality-and that is precisely the function a justice system should
serve. The system is by no means perfect,'6 but it is not so anarchistic
as to justify an argument that no Rule of Law exists.
Conclusion
Arguably every society needs Rule of Law. This Note does not
intend to underplay the importance of stability, predictability, and
justice. However, it is a common Western mistake to narrowly define
these terms, and therefore narrowly construe Rule of Law according
to our particularized conception of what Rule of Law should be.
164. Robert Booth, Epidemic of Marriage Breakdowns Overwhelming Courts Says
Top Judge, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2009, 9:03 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009
/jun/17/divorce-epidemic-judge-warning.
165. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY
APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS (Ridiger Wolfrum & Ulrike
Deutsch eds., 2009).
166. Given that many informal justice systems violate international human rights
norms in the types of remedies they allow.
167. Maley, supra note 7, at 63. To reiterate, Raz's elements are as follows:
All laws should be prospective, open and clear; laws should be
relatively stable; the making of particular laws (particular legal orders)
should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; the
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; the principles of
natural justice must be observed; the courts should have review powers
over the implementation of the other principles; the courts should be
easily accessible; the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies
should not be allowed to pervert the law.
Id.
168. Certainly the corruption within Afghanistan should be considered when
analyzing the legal system, but this consideration is outside the scope of this note.
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Afghanistan is hardly a perfectly stable state, but it would be unwise
to suggest that the problems Afghanistan faces necessarily mean that
the State cannot have Rule of Law. The history upon which
Afghanistan's legal system is based is entirely different from the
histories in the West. Their sources of law are completely different,
far more pluralistic, and, one could argue, more deeply entrenched in
society. A legal structure fit for the Western world should not be
forced onto Afghanistan because it would fail to properly
contextualize the Afghan legal system. Rule of Law can be
established through informal and provincial justice, provided that
justice is relied upon by society, reflective of social norms,
predictable, and deemed to be fair. Absent evidence to the contrary,
Rule of Law exists, and because Afghanistan evidences these
elements, its Rule of Law should not be so often questioned.
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